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3
Assessing Price Indexes for 
Markets with Trading Frictions
A Quantitative Illustration 
Brian K. Kovak 
Carnegie Mellon University and 
National Bureau of Economic Research
Ryan Michaels 
University of Rochester
In the last half-century, reductions in transportation and commu-
nication costs have dramatically reshaped the spatial organization of 
manufacturing production. It is becoming common, for instance, for an 
input to be manufactured abroad and then shipped back to the fi rm that 
designed it (Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001). The physical manufactur-
ing of the good in this case is increasingly concentrated in developing 
economies such as China, which tend to offer lower prices than incum-
bent producers. 
What is the source of these lower prices? They may represent real 
discounts on the same physical good. But there is also a possibility the 
price differentials are spurious. They may refl ect, for instance, unob-
served differences in the composition of goods. Furthermore, even if 
the inputs are physically identical, the quality of the production service 
may vary—as judged, for instance, by the timeliness of delivery and 
the reliability of the fi nished product. As Carlton (1983) stresses, the 
service quality factors into the true price of the good to the buyer (and 
into the real resource cost of the transaction). 
The answer to our question is of considerable importance to price 
index measurement. If price differentials are mistakenly assumed to be 
spurious, price indexes will be constructed to ignore the true decline 
that occurs when lower-price suppliers enter an intermediate market. 
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However, it is equally perilous to neglect the scope for unobserved vari-
ation in product and service quality. The challenge to statistical agen-
cies is that, in practice, it is very diffi cult to isolate real price dispersion 
given data limitations.
In reaction to this, the present paper attempts to provide some guid-
ance for price measurement. We explore how well imperfect, but fea-
sible, price indexes approximate the true price change in markets where 
quality variation and real dispersion commingle. A price index is feasi-
ble if it can be computed from data only on observable outcomes, such 
as market prices. We apply these feasible indexes to markets character-
ized by two key features. First, even if physical products are identical, 
there is scope for variation in service quality that would be unobservable 
to the analyst. Second, the same product and service can still be priced 
differently because of a certain trading friction that impedes arbitrage. 
We carry out our experiment within a simple duopoly pricing model. 
The structure of the model is designed to mimic salient features of the 
market for semiconductor wafers, the subject of our empirical applica-
tion below. The latter market is an excellent example of the contract 
manufacturing sector, in which domestic fi rms design products and off-
shore all fabrication activities. This sector is expanding at a remarkable 
rate in the United States (Bayard, Byrne, and Smith 2013). 
In the model, two large suppliers—a leader (the founding fi rm in 
the market) and a follower (who enters the market last)—produce an 
input for overlapping generations of buyers. We assume that the physi-
cal (observable) dimensions of the input are the same across suppliers. 
This assumption is relatively safe in our context since, in our empirical 
application, we have exceptionally detailed data on physical attributes. 
However, the model allows for variation in the quality of the manufac-
turing service. We make this notion more precise below; the bottom line 
is that lower-quality service will raise the effective price of transacting 
with the follower. At the same time, we introduce a trading friction that 
takes the form of a setup cost that must be paid if a buyer switches sup-
pliers during the life of its product. The setup cost applies regardless of 
the identity of the supplier to whom the buyer is switching. This friction 
implies that, when the follower enters the market, the leader’s custom-
ers may pay its high price even if there is no difference in production 
service. 
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In the second section (“A Pricing Game with Costly Switching”), 
we fi rst solve the model numerically to illustrate its key implications 
for price dispersion and price dynamics. The presence of the setup cost 
implies that, when the follower enters, the extent of price dispersion 
exceeds that which could be attributed to quality variation. However, 
as the leader’s contracts with its original customers end, it will compete 
more aggressively for new generations of buyers. This causes price dis-
persion between fi rms to narrow. In fact, under certain circumstances, 
the effect of the setup cost on price dispersion will abate to the point 
that the price differential at the end of the product life will refl ect only 
variation in service quality. This is a key distinguishing property of the 
model—constant differences in service quality alone do not induce this 
pattern in the dynamics of price dispersion. 
Before we apply the model to price index measurement, we fi rst 
look for evidence consistent with these predictions. To that end, the 
third section (“An Application to the Semiconductor Industry”) pres-
ents results from Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) that are consistent 
with these dynamics. The authors have data on transaction-level prices 
of semiconductor wafers along with the key technological attributes of 
each wafer. They can therefore control for differences across suppliers 
in product composition. However, there may still be differences with 
respect to service quality. Indeed, it is often thought that the leader in 
this market, Taiwan, has software tools that enable it to provide higher-
quality service, for which it presumably charges a higher price than its 
main competitor, China.1 The theory in Section Two suggests a way of 
identifying quality-adjusted dispersion in this setting: Byrne, Kovak, 
and Michaels can test for whether the price difference between these 
suppliers narrows after China’s entry into a particular wafer market.2 
They fi nd that, on average, the price differential between Taiwan and 
China does close substantially over the life of a given semiconductor 
technology: It falls from 39 percent in the year of Chinese entry to 10 
percent after fi ve years. This narrowing is consistent with the presence 
of real dispersion, although the differential remaining even at the end of 
the product life is suggestive of quality dispersion.
In light of this evidence, Section Four (“Feasible Price Indexes”) 
returns to the model and uses it to study the performance of differ-
ent price indexes when the observed change in average market price 
refl ects both real dispersion and variation in quality. This section fi rst 
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calculates a benchmark index that assumes the analyst has perfect infor-
mation regarding quality and is able to directly adjust for the effective 
cost of transacting with the follower. It then compares the results of this 
benchmark with feasible price indexes that can be calculated even when 
the analyst has access only to data on market prices. We consider three 
examples.
The fi rst feasible index is based on the idea that price dispersion 
across suppliers derives exclusively from quality variation. In this case, 
the index can be computed by analogy to a standard superlative index, 
which treats a supplier’s service as a separate “good” and averages price 
changes across providers. The second feasible index takes the oppo-
site view: All of the observed differential represents a real discount. 
Accordingly, one can simply average price levels across suppliers and 
compute the change in the average price across periods. Not surpris-
ingly, this index yields the largest declines in the price level when the 
lower-priced supplier enters the market. The third index is our preferred 
index, since it tries to strike a compromise between these two. It relies 
on a simple implication of the theory, noted above: the effect of the 
setup cost on price dispersion abates over the course of the product life 
cycle, leaving a price differential that refl ects only variation in service 
quality. As a result, we can use the observed price differentials late in 
the product life cycle to proxy for unobserved quality variation. This 
enables a simple correction to market price data while not foreclosing a 
role for real price dispersion. 
Section Four confi rms that our preferred index performs best. Yet, 
as we detail later, the correction here is still somewhat conservative in 
that it continues to slightly understate the extent of the true price decline 
that occurs when the follower enters the market. We then illustrate how 
to adjust our preferred index so that it delivers an upper bound on the 
extent of the price decline. The true price change can then be bracketed. 
Section Five offers a conclusion.
A PRICING GAME WITH COSTLY SWITCHING
This section begins by describing an extension of the simple pricing 
game in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013). Our modeling is guided 
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by a large literature that studies price setting in markets under costly 
switching.3 The model here deviates slightly from this preceding litera-
ture, which typically restricted attention to the analytics of games with 
symmetric players. Refl ecting our interest in the quantitative dynamics 
following the entry of a low-cost supplier, we analyze a calibrated game 
with asymmetric actors. The leader is the founding fi rm in the market 
and enjoys monopoly status for a time. The follower enters the market 
subsequently and has a lower unit cost of production but inferior pro-
duction technology. Each fi rm competes to supply an input to overlap-
ping generations of fi nal-goods producers—the consumers, or buyers, 
in this market. 
The Model
The basic environment
The model is perhaps the minimalist structure needed to consider 
some of the questions of interest. There are three periods, and there 
are two types of agents in the market—buyers and manufacturers of 
an intermediate good. A cohort of buyers enters in each of the three 
periods. The period-1 cohort is present in periods 1 and 2, the period-2 
cohort is present in periods 2 and 3, and the period-3 cohort is present in 
period 3. Each cohort is of mass 1. Buyers have unit demand, and they 
purchase from one of the suppliers as long as the price is less than the 
reservation value, a constraint that we discuss in detail below. 
Even though buyers purchase the same physical input from both 
suppliers, we assume there are details of the production process that 
have to be tailored to the buyer’s order. To preview the example in Sec-
tion Three, consider the market for semiconductor wafers, where buy-
ers are designers of integrated circuits. Suppliers are fi rms that fabricate 
silicon wafers on which the design is implanted. Each buyer purchases a 
wafer with the same size and density of transistors, but there are details 
of the design—the precise manner in which transistors are arrayed on 
the wafer—that require some specialization of the production process. 
Formally, we follow in the spirit of Klemperer (1995) and assume that 
design complexity, y, is distributed uniformly from 0 (lowest quality) 
to 1 (highest quality). This heterogeneity across buyers would be unob-
servable to an econometrician who has data only on the physical wafer 
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size and line width. In this sense, the model allows for price dispersion 
that refl ects unobserved heterogeneity.
Turning to the manufacturers, Firm A is the leader and is present in 
the market from period 1 onward. Firm B is the follower; it joins the 
market in period 2. We assume Firm A is at the technology frontier. To 
again borrow an example from the semiconductor wafer market, it is 
thought that Taiwan’s fabrication fi rms have intellectual property that 
enables them to more effi ciently produce a highly complex design. This 
means that, although Firm B (China, in the case of the wafer market) 
can fabricate any chip, the consumer must pay a cost to monitor and 
consult with this supplier. We assume that buyers who purchase from 
Firm B pay a per-period monitoring cost, τy (with τ > 0), that is increas-
ing in design complexity. What helps Firm B to compete in the face of 
this disadvantage is that it enjoys a lower unit cost of production, which 
we denote by cB. Specifi cally, we assume that both fi rms have constant 
unit costs, and that cA > cB.
When a buyer initiates production with a supplier, it must pay a 
startup cost, s. This cost has to be paid again if the buyer switches 
suppliers. Thus, if a buyer purchased from Firm A in period t − 1 but 
switches to Firm B in period t, it must pay s again (independent of its 
quality). Hence, this buyer would pay a price, pAt , to remain with Firm 
A in period t, and would pay pBt  + τy + s to switch to Firm B, where pBt 
is Firm B’s posted price in period t, τy is the monitoring cost, and the 
startup cost s acts as a cost of switching. 
There are very clear examples of switching costs in the wafer mar-
ket. To illustrate, certain equipment has to be supplied by the customer 
and calibrated to the processes and technologies of each supplier. For 
instance, the customer supplies the mask, through which its design of 
transistors is projected onto a wafer. The mask must be specifi ed to 
sync with the supplier’s proprietary technologies, which are generally 
incompatible across manufacturers. This makes it diffi cult to re-source 
a product once wafer production begins. In the case of a mask, the price 
of a new one is high, at over $1 million. As a result, notes one industry 
association, “The time and cost associated with [switching] tend to lock 
customers into a particular [supplier]” (Gabriel Consulting Group 2006, 
p. 1).4
Last, following much of the literature on costly switching, the 
model prohibits price discrimination. This restriction is roughly con-
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sistent with wafer supplier contracts, which limit a supplier’s freedom 
in charging appreciably different prices across its customers.5 Thus, we 
assume the price pAt   (pBt ) applies to all Firm A (B) buyers in period t.
The terminal period problem 
The problem is solved by backward induction. To analyze the 
period-3 problem, we fi rst conjecture that there is a threshold y2 so that 
Firm B attracts all period-2 entrants with designs y that satisfy y ≤ y2. 
In other words, we assume the least “advanced” producer attracts buy-
ers with the least complex designs. This conjecture will be confi rmed 
in equilibrium. In what follows, since y is uniformly distributed, we 
refer to the mass of buyers y2 as Firm B’s customer base at the start of 
period 3. The mass of higher-quality buyers 1 − y2 makes up Firm A’s 
customer base. 
There are three groups of buyers to whom Firm A may sell: mem-
bers of its own customer base, members of Firm B’s customer base, and 
buyers who enter in period 3 (period-3 entrants). The demand sched-
ules for each of these cohorts are given below. Throughout, we let σtj j 
represent the share of Firm j’s customer base that it retains in period t, 
σtj 0 the share of period-t entrants that it attracts, and σtj i the share of Firm 






where p j t denotes the price of Firm j in period t. 
Each of the components of Equation (3.1) is straightforward. Firm 
A retains a member y > y2 of its customer base if its price, p A3, is less than 
the quality-adjusted price of its rival, p B3  + τy, plus the cost of switching 
production to a new supplier, s. It poaches a buyer y ≤ y2 in Firm B’s 
customer base if its price, plus the cost of switching, is less than p B3  + 
τy. Last, Firm A attracts a new (period-3) entrant if its price is less than 
the quality-adjusted price of Firm B. Observe that s does not appear in 
the entrant’s decision, since it must pay the cost of setting up regardless 
of the supplier from which it sources. 
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Absent from Equation (3.1) is any mention of the buyer’s (gross) 
payoff from the sale of its fi nal good. This is because the gross payoff 
is independent of the identity of the supplier. Thus, conditional on par-
ticipation in the market, the buyer’s choice of supplier depends only on 
the relative (quality-adjusted) prices and setup costs. We only assume at 
this stage that the gross payoff exceeds the minimum cost to the fi nal-
goods maker. Later, we will specify the payoff and calibrate it so that 
the participation constraint does not in fact bind in periods 2 and 3. 
Firm A’s terminal-period problem may now be stated as follows. 
From Equation (3.1), we have that total sales by Firm A in period 3 are 
given by
(3.2)
       
 
 
The leader then sets its price to maximize profi ts, (p A3 − c
A)YA3 , which 
yields an optimal price of the form p A3 (p
B
3 , y2). Firm B faces the analo-
gous problem, the solution of which is represented by p B3 (p
A
3 , y2). The 
intersection of the two best responses yields the terminal-period equi-




The (pure-strategy) pricing policy of a fi rm can typically be parti-
tioned into three regions. Consider, for instance, the behavior of Firm 
A, whose optimal price is shown in Figure 3.1 as a function of Firm B’s 
price. Over a range of low Firm B prices, Firm A will concede all new 
entrants to its rival. The reason for doing so is that it can earn greater 
profi ts by setting a higher price and selling exclusively to its partially 
“locked-in” buyers. As Firm B raises its price, it becomes profi table 
for Firm A to compete for new entrants. Thus, there is an intermediate 
range of Firm B prices over which Firm A both retains its own customer 
base and captures a share of new entrants. Lastly, still higher Firm B 
prices enable Firm A to poach from Firm B’s customer base. 
Interestingly, the pricing rule in Figure 3.1 is not necessarily con-
tinuous across these regions. As a result, one fi rm’s best response can 
pass through the “gap” in the other’s, yielding no equilibrium (in pure 
strategies).6 The reason for these discontinuities can be traced to the fact 
that, given s > 0, no fi rm wishes to charge a price so as to acquire only 
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a marginal share of new entrants. If Firm A does this, for instance, it 
renders the y = 1 entrant (the most complex design) indifferent between 
suppliers. But in that case, A’s incumbents will be strictly inframarginal 
because they face s > 0. As a result, the fi rm can increase profi t by dis-
cretely raising its price: It makes a higher profi t from incumbents while 
sacrifi cing an infi nitesimal share of new entrants. Accordingly, Firm A 
delays reducing its price to compete for incoming buyers. Then, when 
pB is suffi ciently high, Firm A can increase profi ts by reducing its price 
discontinuously and capturing a discrete share of new entrants, even 
while still charging a reasonably high price level to its incumbents. 
Despite these discontinuities in the best responses, we identify a 
realistic calibration of the model under which there does in fact exist a 
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which both suppliers sell to new 
entrants in each period (a “no-sale” equilibrium, to borrow from Farrell 
and Klemperer’s [2007] language). We discuss this calibration in greater 
detail below.
Figure 3.1  Firm A Best Response
NOTE: This shows Firm A’s optimal price, given the Firm B price shown along the 
horizontal axis. The three regions of the graph are discussed in the main text. 
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The period-2 problem
We now turn to the period-2 problem. There are two types of buy-
ers: new entrants and members of Firm A’s customer base. We begin 
with the former. A period-2 entrant with design y will purchase from 
Firm A only if the presented discounted sum of period-2 and period-3 
prices is less than what the entrant would face if it purchased from Firm 
B. This implies that the buyer at the threshold y = y2 must be indifferent 
across suppliers. Accordingly, y2 solves
(3.3)  
  ,
where β < 1 is the discount factor. Equation (3.3) implicitly defi nes the 
threshold, y2 , as a function of period-2 prices, y2(pA2, pB2 ). Thus, Firm A’s 
demand schedule among period-2 entrants is 1 − y2(pA2, pB2 ) ≡ σ2A0 (pA2, pB2 ).7
      In addition, Firm A begins the period with a customer base. Let y1 
denote the threshold level of quality so that all entrants in period 1 (the 
initial period of the market) with y ≥ y1 participate and so purchase for 
Firm A. Thus, Firm A’s customer base is 1 − y1. These buyers remain in 
the market for period 2 and then exit. Hence, their problem is a static 
one: they remain with Firm A if pA2 ≤ pB2  + τy + s. Since y is uniformly 
distributed (conditional on y ≥ y1), Firm A retains a measure of its old 
customers equal to
 




subject to period-2 sales 
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and period-3 sales YA3 (y2(p A2, pB2 )), given in Equation (3.2). Firm B solves 
the analogous problem. We denote the equilibrium prices in the period 
by PA2 (y1) and PB2  (y1). 
The initial period problem 
The period-1 problem is a monopoly problem, as Firm A is the only 
supplier. The period-1 cohort’s problem is to source its input from Firm 
A or not participate in the market at all. To solve this cohort’s prob-
lem, then, we must make more explicit the demand side of the market. 
Our goal here is modest: We wish to introduce a reduced-form demand 
schedule that enables us to pose a simple monopoly problem for Firm 
A in period 1 and is consistent with the full participation of all period-2 
and period-3 entrants. To this end, we assume that the payoff, F, to the 
buyer from its (unit) sale of the fi nal good has the form 
(3.4) F(y) = R + ry,
where R,r > 0. This assumes, reasonably in our view, that higher-quality 
fi nal goods “fetch” a higher price, so the payoff is increasing in y.
Given Equation (3.4), the buyer’s problem in period 1 can be made 
straightforward, if we make three assumptions. First, if the buyer 
chooses to leave the market altogether in period 2, exit is costless. This 
means that a suffi cient condition for participation in period 1 is F(y) > 
p A1. To see this, note that a buyer who enters in period 1 and remains 
in the market through period 2 has a present discounted payoff from 
participation equal to
F(y) − p A1 + β max{F(y) − p A2 ,  F(y) − pB2 − τy − s,  0}.
Since exit is costless, the buyer will leave the market if the maximum 
payoff across the two suppliers is negative. Furthermore, it pays no cost 
to leave. In this case, could a lower-y buyer ever be better off if it waited 
and signed up with the lower-price supplier, Firm B, in period 2? If it 
did, its discounted payoff would be β max{F(y) − pB2 − τy − s,  0}. Notice 
the presence of s, since the setup cost has to be paid upon entry. Com-
paring the two payoffs, it is clear that, as long as F(y) − p A1  > 0, the buyer 
is always better off participating in period 1 than waiting until period 2.
up15shmg10ch3.indd   99 2/17/2015   11:29:21 AM
100   Kovak and Michaels
However, the latter is not, in general, a necessary condition. Even 
if F(y) < p A1 , a buyer may stand to make a profi t in period 2. Thus, it 
may still enter in period 1 if that is the only opportunity for it to enter. 
There are a number of ways to make F(y) > p A1  a necessary condition. 
We choose to do this by assuming that the fi rm has no access to exter-
nal fi nance. This implies the fi rm cannot borrow to cover losses during 
period 1, which in turn implies a nonnegativity constraint on dividends: 
F(y) − p A1  > 0. Thus, F(y) > p A1  is a necessary and suffi cient condition 
for participation in period 1.
Last, what happens to a fi rm if it declines to participate on account 
of F(y) < p A1 ? We assume that ideas are not storable. This means that 
fi rms for which F(y) < p A1  do not retain the option to return to the mar-
ket in period 2.8 Therefore, we do not have to keep track of buyers that 
decline to enter in period 1.
These assumptions achieve a substantial simplifi cation. In particu-
lar, if F(y) > p A1  is necessary and suffi cient, then the choice of partici-
pation collapses to a static problem. From Equation (3.4), we see that 
the buyer, y, participates if y ≥ y (p A1 ) ≡ (p A1  − R)/r. It follows that the 
monopolist supplier faces a linear demand schedule 1 − y1 (p A1 ) = (R + 
r − p A1 )/r. The monopolist then selects its price p A1  to maximize present 
discounted profi ts,
,
where πA2 (y1) is the discounted present value of profi ts as of the start of 
period 2 conditional on the equilibrium plays in periods 2 and 3. 
Quantitative Analysis
Calibration
We now illustrate the model’s mechanics. To that end, we calibrate 
and solve it numerically. There are seven parameters (β,cA,cB,s,τ,R,r) 
that have to be chosen. Of these, only the discount factor β can be set 
without reference to a particular input market. We assume the period 
is one year and set β = 0.95, which implies an annual real interest rate 
slightly higher than 5 percent (Table 3.1). The remaining parameters 
will vary across markets. We calibrate the model to the offshore semi-
conductor wafer market.9 
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The costs of production and the quality premium, τ, are chosen to 
target the two suppliers’ long-run price levels and the leader’s (Firm 
A’s) market share. To be more precise, we seek to have the model’s 
terminal-period outcomes match observed outcomes “late” in a prod-
uct’s life cycle. As for how “late” ought to be measured, the model 
suggests that we would like to observe market outcomes after the ini-
tial cohort of Taiwan’s customers conclude their production runs. The 
evidence available from supplier agreements indicates that customers 
arrange for at least three-year production runs, but with an option to 
renew.10 To allow for some “slippage” around the three-year mark, we 
focus on market outcomes after the fi rst fi ve years of a product’s life. 
Next, we select s. We have no direct estimates of this, but the testi-
mony of industry experts (see footnote 4) suggests that switches are very 
rare. We also observe that customers remain in very long-term arrange-
ments with suppliers. Fabless fi rms’ annual reports to shareholders, for 
instance, show that fabless fi rms maintain relationships with Taiwan’s 
TSMC and China’s SMIC for at least four to fi ve years at a time. There-
fore, we choose s to imply a “low” switch rate, which we take to be on 
the order of 10–15 percent of Firm A’s period-2 customer base.
Last, we now calibrate Equation (3.4). For given R, the slope, r, in 
Equation (3.4) pins down the fi rm’s incentive to target high-y buyers: 
if r is high, the supplier charges a high price to take advantage of these 
buyers’ willingness to pay. But as a result, many low-y buyers elect not 
to participate. We therefore set r to target a size for the period-1 market 
NOTE: This presents the calibration of the pricing game. The parameters are chosen so 
that the model induces the moments on the far right side of the table. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of the values for the parameters used in the model 
simulation. 
Table 3.1  Calibration
Parameter Interpretation Value Target moment/reason
β Discount factor 0.95 Real interest rate
c A Unit cost, Firm A 400 Long-run Taiwan price
c B Unit cost, Firm B 334 Long-run China price
τ Monitoring cost 395 Long-run Taiwan mkt. share
s Switching cost 197.5 Probability of switching
r Buyer’s payoff 432 Period-1 mkt. size
R Buyer’s payoff 688 Firm A profi ts
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relative to the size of the period-2 market. The idea here is that, in many 
markets, there is a ramp-up in terms of the volume of business after the 
introduction of a new product. Our data from the wafer market suggest 
that the size of the market at the time of product introduction is around 
one-half of its size in the mature phase of the product’s life. Since there 
will be a measure 2 of period-2 buyers, we must then set r so that nearly 
a measure 1 of buyers elect to participate. This means that y1 is not far 
from zero. Since there is a measure 2 of buyers in period 2, this cor-
responds to about one-half of the size of the market in the mature phase 
of the product life cycle.
As for R, this is chosen to ensure that all period-2 and period-3 
entrants wish to participate. If R is suffi ciently high, then Equation (3.4) 
indicates that even the lowest-quality buyer (y = 0) will make a pur-
chase. In particular, one can easily show that, in order to guarantee full 
participation in periods 2 and 3, it is suffi cient that R > R̂  ≡ maxt = 2,3
{pAt , pBt  }.11 Of course, this provides only a lower bound; it does not 
point-identify R. To do the latter, we note that our model very likely 
understates the degree of competition in this market. Though Taiwan 
and China are the most signifi cant producers, there are others. There-
fore, we choose R in order to contain the rather outsized profi ts implied 
by the model. This means that R is set to roughly target R̂ . 
Results: Price dispersion
We focus here on the model’s predictions regarding the dynamics of 
price dispersion. We delay a discussion of aggregate price changes until 
later. Table 3.2 reports the results. There are two we wish to highlight. 
First, the model implies that the degree of price dispersion declines 
over the product life cycle. The model implies a gap of roughly $250 
in the period in which the lagging supplier enters, and a gap of around 
$150 in the next period. The source of these dynamics is very intuitive. 
In period 2, the leader charges a relatively high price to its customers, 
who are partially locked in because of the cost to switch. However, as 
the leader’s original customers exit the market, it has a stronger incen-
tive to compete aggressively for new entrants. The difference in prices 
between the leader and the follower therefore narrows. This result is a 
simple but important property of the model, and it is one that is absent 
if the only source of price dispersion is time-invariant unobserved het-
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erogeneity. Thus, it gives us a testable prediction to take to data, which 
we do in the next section.
We also note here that the magnitude of dispersion in period 2, and 
the extent of its decline in period 3, line up reasonably well with the 
estimates from the semiconductor wafer market discussed in Section 
3. For this reason, we believe that our calibrated model, although quite 
simple, provides some insight into price determination in this market. 
As such, it should serve as a useful laboratory in which to study the 
properties of various price indexes, a topic to which we return in Sec-
tion Four, “Feasible Price Indexes.” 
Second, the price differential not only narrows in period 3, but it 
very nearly approaches the differential in the frictionless model where 
s = 0. To see more clearly how this comes about, return to the period-3 
problem for a moment. We impose the restriction that each supplier 
retains its customer base from the period-2 cohort, as occurs in equi-
librium for our calibration (see the fi nal row in Table 3.2). Under these 
conditions, a little bit of algebra reveals that the difference, Δ3 ≡ p
A
3 − pB3 ,
in period-3 prices is given by the expression
(3.5)  ,  
where Δ* represents the difference between Firm A and B prices in the 
frictionless (s = 0) equilibrium. 
NOTE: This presents the equilibrium of the pricing game discussed in the main text. 
The calibration underlying this solution is shown in Table 3.1.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.
Table 3.2  Equilibrium Prices and Market Shares
Firm B period-2 price, pB2 456.37
Firm B period-3 price, pB3 686.80
Period-2 price differential, Δ2 252.00
Period-3 price differential, Δ3 150.38
Frictionless (s = 0) price differential 153.67
Measure of participants in period 1 0.99
Firm A period-2 market share 0.67
Firm A period-3 market share 0.55
Measure of switchers in period 2 0.13
Measure of switchers in period 3 0.00
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We unpack Equation (3.5) in two steps. First, it is straightforward to 
show that Δ* is the difference in market prices that makes the marginal 
buyer with design y* indifferent across suppliers. This means that Δ* 
compensates for the transaction cost, so that Δ* = y*τ. We therefore inter-
pret Δ* as the difference in market prices that could be accounted for by 
(unobserved) heterogeneity in quality. Second, the source of the wedge 
between Δ3 and Δ* is intuitive. To see this, note that the wedge vanishes 
if y2=1/2. Each supplier in this case charges a higher price level than in 
the frictionless model, but the two suppliers’ incentive to exploit their 
customer bases is the same. Hence, the price difference refl ects entirely 
the difference in the quality of the production service. If y2 < 1/2 , in 
contrast, then Firm A’s market share is relatively large. As a result, it 
charges a relatively high price to “milk” its customer base, and Δ3 > Δ*.
For our calibration, it is true that y2 ≈ 1/2, which implies Δ3 ≈ Δ*. This 
suggests that one might use the observed difference in market prices 
late in the product cycle to proxy for the contribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity to the price differentials. In particular, one can subtract 
Δ3 from price differentials earlier in the product life cycle, such as Δ2, 
and thereby adjust prices all along the product life cycle for unobserved 
heterogeneity. This yields an estimate of the share of the period-2 dif-
ferential that is due to frictional dispersion. More exactly, we have that
(3.6)  ,  
which is the percentage of the observed differential that is “real.”12 As 
we discuss in greater detail below, this simple correction will signifi -
cantly aid our measurement strategy in Section Four. 
Before we turn to the model’s implications for aggregate price 
changes, we digress slightly in the next section to consider some recent 
evidence for the model’s key prediction regarding the dynamics of price 
dispersion. 
AN APPLICATION TO THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
We believe that the model presented in the previous section cap-
tures features common to many intermediate input markets. Indeed, it 
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is, in principle, relevant to any market with entry and clearly defi ned 
product turnover. But our empirical exploration of the model’s implica-
tions is, of course, limited by available data. In a prior work (Byrne, 
Kovak, and Michaels 2013) we focused on the contract semiconductor 
manufacturing industry, for which we have detailed, transaction-level 
data. In the remainder of this section, we briefl y review the structure of 
this market and the fi ndings reported in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels.
Semiconductor production involves a number of discrete steps.13 
A chip is fi rst designed using computer-aided tools that convert the 
desired functionality into a network of transistors and interconnections. 
The chip is then fabricated by depositing and etching away conducting 
and insulating materials to create a three-dimensional pattern of transis-
tors and connections on the surface of a silicon wafer. Each step in the 
process is repeated for each of many chips, called “die,” resulting in 
a grid of identical, completed die on the surface of the wafer. The die 
are then tested, sliced up, and placed in protective packages with leads 
allowing the chips to be connected to circuit boards in a fi nal product. 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) focus on the second step in this 
production process—the fabrication of semiconductor chips based on 
a particular design. Semiconductor fabrication technology has evolved 
steadily over time and can be characterized by a few observable tech-
nological traits such as the size of the wafer and the size of the small-
est feature that can be produced on the surface of the wafer, called the 
“line width.” The number of physical layers needed to create the chips 
has also increased over time, refl ecting increased design complexity 
and leading to increased fabrication cost. Semiconductor technology 
evolves discretely over time, with only a few specifi c wafer sizes and 
line widths present in the market at any moment in time, making it 
possible to control for technological differences across products very 
fl exibly. 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels’ (2013) empirical results use data on 
arm’s-length transactions between fi rms specializing in chip design and 
marketing, called “fabless fi rms” since they have no fabrication facili-
ties, and fi rms called “foundries” that specialize in fabricating other 
fi rms’ chips. Most fabless fi rms are located in the United States and 
Europe, and they correspond to the buyers in the model just described. 
The largest foundries are located in Taiwan and China, which together 
account for 74 percent of foundry output. Taiwanese foundries enter a 
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product market, defi ned by a wafer-size and line-width combination, at 
least eight quarters ahead of Chinese foundries. The dominant Taiwan-
ese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 
is the overall market leader—it is Firm A in the model. TSMC is widely 
considered as possessing the most advanced design integration tools 
and engineering support. 
The data come from a proprietary database collected by the Global 
Semiconductor Alliance (GSA), a nonprofi t industry organization. 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels’ (2013) extract spans 2004–2010 and cov-
ers a representative sample of about 20 percent of the wafers produced 
by the worldwide foundry sector. The GSA data are unique in provid-
ing details on transaction prices, along with all technological charac-
teristics of fi nished semiconductor wafers that are relevant for pricing, 
including wafer size, line width, and numbers of various types of lay-
ers. This detailed product-characteristic information makes it possible 
to compare average prices for physically identical inputs across suppli-
ers located in different countries.
Formally, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) implement such a 
comparison in a hedonic regression framework that relates wafer prices 
to observable technological characteristics, quarter indicators, and indi-
cators for supplier’s location.14 The controls for product characteristics 
enable them to estimate the effect of location on price, holding fi xed 
the composition of goods. The data reveal substantial price differences 
across suppliers. Comparing the two largest suppliers, a Chinese wafer 
sells at a 17 percent discount compared to an otherwise identical Tai-
wanese wafer.15 
This average difference masks, however, interesting dynamics in 
price dispersion. Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) go on to estimate 
how the price differential evolves following Chinese entry. The key 
result is replicated in Figure 3.2 (which is Figure 4 in Byrne, Kovak, 
and Michaels). The dashed gray line plots raw quarterly price differ-
ences for the process technology with the largest sales during our time 
period, 200mm wafers with 180nm line width. Despite the noise in the 
series, it is clear that the average price differential closes considerably 
over the life of this technology. It falls from around $600 to around $150 
more than fi ve years after Chinese entry. This pattern applies to other 
technologies with smaller sales as well. The black solid line in the fi g-
ure plots the difference in price averaged across all technologies in each 
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quarter following Chinese entry and exhibits quite consistent declines 
in the gap between Chinese and Taiwanese prices.16 Last, whereas the 
solid line pools across technologies, the dotted line in the fi gure esti-
mates the price differential based exclusively on the typical variation 
within the life of a technology. It reveals a very similar pattern.
As Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) stress, this dynamic pat-
tern is unlikely to be driven by unobserved differences in products or 
services across Chinese and Taiwanese suppliers. The price differences 
start out large and then converge for each new process technology, so 
constant differences across suppliers or differences that evolve over 
calendar time for all technologies are unlikely to explain the observed 
Figure 3.2  The Closing China-Taiwan Price Gap Following China’s 
Entry
NOTE: This presents the difference between China’s and Taiwan’s price for certain cat-
egories of wafers. The 200mm/180nm is one of the most popular wafers in the sam-
ple. The cross-technology average measures the mean of the price differentials across 
wafers. The within-technology fi t is derived from a regression model with wafer fi xed 
effects and thus uses only within-technology variation in the price differential. See 
Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) for more.
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pattern. In other words, steady improvements in the quality or reliabil-
ity of China's production service may explain price differentials across 
technologies, but they are unlikely to account for the sharp, within-
technology dynamics we observe. This also rules out explanations 
related to brand recognition, customer service, intellectual property-
rights protection, tax policy, and other factors that might make Chinese 
producers more attractive over time. 
Accordingly, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) argue that the 
dynamics refl ect the presence of real, frictional price dispersion. The 
pattern of narrowing differentials is clearly consistent with that predicted 
by the theory of switching costs sketched in Section Two, “A Pricing 
Game with Costly Switching.” This fi nding motivates our work in the 
next section, as we consider developing a price index that admits roles 
for both frictional dispersion and constant, unobserved heterogeneity.17 
FEASIBLE PRICE INDEXES
Our goal is to measure the change in price of a production service in 
an environment in which the quality of service varies across suppliers. 
The source of the difference in service quality is not especially critical, 
though, for the purpose of this exercise. In our model, the quality of 
service varies inversely with the complexity of the design, y. But this is 
merely one way to operationalize the idea; heterogeneity across designs 
is not, per se, signifi cant. 
It is worth taking a moment at the outset to elaborate on this point. 
The following discussion should help reveal the generality of the prob-
lem confronting price index construction. In so doing, it also points the 
way toward developing the “ideal” price index in this setting, which 
will serve as the benchmark against which all feasible alternatives are 
judged.
A Benchmark
There is a way to reinterpret the model that is particularly help-
ful. Imagine that suppliers produce and ship the input to customers. 
Assume, moreover, that Firm B has an inferior transport technology. In 
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this context, it is natural to reinterpret y as distance from Firm B. The 
cost, τy, is then read as a transport cost, so that a Firm B customer with 
unit demand who is y units away must purchase 1 + τy units because 
τy are “lost in transit.” In this interpretation, it is the customer who 
implants its own design on the chip after receipt of the product. 
This problem is formally identical to our own. But what design the 
retailer implants on the wafer after it is shipped by Firm B is clearly 
orthogonal to how we measure the price of the production (and trans-
portation) service. In other words, in this (re)interpretation, the mea-
surement of the input’s price is unrelated to, and unaffected by, the pres-
ence of heterogeneous designs. All that matters, in terms of the real 
resource cost to customers, is the transaction cost, τy. 
It follows that, in our preferred interpretation of the problem, design 
heterogeneity matters for price measurement only insofar as it implies a 
particular transaction cost. If we could just observe these costs (τy), we 
would fold them into a comprehensive, or quality-adjusted, measure-
ment of the price paid by Firm B buyers, p̂ B ≡ pB + τy, for the production 
service. After adjusting for τy, this is the same service provided by Firm 
A. Hence, at that point, we simply aggregate across the pA’s and p̂B’s 
in a particular period and compare the result with the average price in 
the prior period. This is, in fact, how we will build our benchmark price 
index, to which we now turn.
Our benchmark index requires the most information on the part of 
the analyst. In particular, the analyst is assumed to observe the trans-
action cost, τy, paid by a Firm B customer with design y. Hence, the 
analyst measures prices, pA and p̂B. 
Since each price in the model (inclusive of τy) pertains to the same 
service, it is not hard to aggregate across observed prices. In any period 
t, there is a set It of buyers with measure μt . The period-t (with t = 2 or 
3) price is then given simply by 
, 
where pt(i) is the price paid by buyer i ϵ It (and equal to either pAt or p̂ Bt ). 
This aggregates prices paid across the measure μt of buyers, weighting 
each equally, since all participants purchase one unit of the input.18 This 
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price is compared to the average price in the prior period to derive the 
price change.
To illustrate the calculations, consider the period-2 problem. It 
is helpful to fi rst take the case where Firm A retains the full measure 
1 − y1 of its period-1 customers but only sells to new entrants with 
y ≥ y2. It follows that a measure 2 − y1 − y2 pays p A2  for the input, whereas 
each new entrant y ϵ [0,y2] pays p B2 + τy. Therefore, the average period-2 
price, P*2 , is
 
Since the only price in period 1 is pA1 , the price index in period 2 would 
be P*2  / pA1 .
The problem is slightly more cumbersome if Firm B poaches in 
period 2, as occurs in the model. In this case, Firm B poaches from Firm 
A for all qualities less than a threshold, y p2, where the threshold satisfi es 
y1 < y p2 < y2. Therefore, Firm A supplies a measure 1 − y2 of entrants 
and 1 − y p2 of incumbents. Firm B supplies, in turn, a measure of y2 of 
entrants and y p2  − y1 of incumbents. Given this distribution of buyers 
across designs, the average price becomes 
(3.7) 
In what follows, it will be instructive to integrate the terms enclosed in 
braces on the right half of Equation (3.7) and rewrite this as a weighted 




is the average design supplied by Firm B. Hence, the average price 
(Equation [3.8]) is a weighted average of the market prices plus a mea-
sure of the average transaction cost paid by Firm B buyers. Again, the 
price index is simply P*2 /pA1.
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Feasible Alternatives
In practice, the BLS does not observe the level of detail—namely, 
τ—needed to calculate the benchmark index. We now consider several 
indexes with less demanding data requirements. We refer to these as 
feasible price indexes.
Within index
The fi rst of these is consistent with our understanding of BLS-IPP 
practice, which typically treats the identity of the seller as a price-
forming characteristic (Nakamura and Steinsson 2012). In this case, 
there are, in effect, two types of goods: those sold by Firm A and those 
sold by Firm B. Under these circumstances, standard practice is to com-
pute the price index by fi rst calculating price changes within each sup-
plier and then averaging these changes across suppliers. We refer to this 
as the within index. This contrasts with the benchmark index, which 
fi rst averages prices across suppliers and then takes the difference. 
Applied to the period-2 data, the within index is very simple. Since 
Firm B does not participate in period 1, the within index is computed 
just by taking the ratio of Firm A’s market, pA2 /pA1. 
Average index
The second measure takes the opposite approach to the problem of 
unobserved quality. The strategy here is to take the average period-2 
posted market price across suppliers for all qualities greater than y1 and 
compare it to the period-1 price. We refer to this as the average index.20 
This index is distinguished by the fact that it takes no account of 
the transaction costs—it makes no quality adjustment. Accordingly, the 
average index is calculated by simply excluding τy from the price paid 
by each of Firm B’s customers in the benchmark index (Equation [3.7]). 
The average period-2 price is then 
(3.10)  
 ,
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and the index is calculated according to Pα2 /pA1. This approach is more 
concerned that the new supplier is likely to sell the same qualities at 
lower prices, which does in fact happen if y1 < y2. In these instances, 
quality-adjusted price declines faced by buyers are not recorded by the 
within index.
Diff-in-diff index
Last, we present an index that attempts to strike a compromise 
between the within and average indexes. The index confronts the chal-
lenge of unobserved heterogeneity but does not abandon the idea that 
there may be quality-adjusted price dispersion in equilibrium. At the 
same time, it does not place the same data requirements on the analysts 
as the benchmark index does. 
The construction of what we will call the diff-in-diff index is guided 
by the model in Section Two (“A Pricing Game with Costly Switch-
ing”). One of the key points of the section was the idea that one can 
use the observed price differentials late in the product life cycle, Δ3 , to 
proxy for the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity, denoted by Δ*. 
This implies that the quality-adjusted period-2 differential, Δ2 , can be 
estimated by netting off Δ3 , which is the most that could be attributed to 
quality. This boils down to doing quality adjustment by simply infl ating 
Firm B’s price by Δ3. To see this, let p̆B2  denote our estimate of Firm B’s 
period-2 price adjusted for service quality. We defi ne p̆B2 according to 
the quality-adjusted period-2 differential, pA2 − p̆B2 = pA2  − pB2 − (pA3 − pB3  ). 
Canceling the pA2 ’s, we have that p̆B2  = pB2  + Δ3.
This corrected price differential is the key input into the diff-in-diff 
index. The index itself is now easy to construct. We add Δ3 to pB2  in 
the average index (Equation [3.10]), use the proxy Δ3 =Δ* = τy*, and 
integrate. (Recall that y* is Firm B’s market share in the frictionless 
equilibrium.) The result can then be written as 
(3.11) .
Comparing Equation (3.11) to the benchmark (Equation [3.8]), we 
see our adjustment is exact only if y* = θ. In fact, a discrepancy between 
y* and θ will likely arise. To see why, recall from Section Two that what 
drives a wedge between market prices in the frictionless equilibrium 
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is the transaction cost faced by the marginal buyer (who is indifferent 
across the two suppliers). That is, the difference, Δ*, in market prices 
is given by y*τ. However, a quality-adjusted price index like those in 
Equations (3.7) and (3.8) requires calculation of the average price inclu-
sive of transaction costs among all Firm B buyers, as represented by θ. 
Since the transaction cost increases with y, the marginal cost exceeds 
the average. It is very likely, then, that θ < y*. In that case, P δ2 would 
overestimate P*2 .
The comparison between y* and θ becomes clearer if we consider 
a special, but informative, case. Suppose that y1 = 0 = y
p
2 . This is an 
instructive case because, in our calibrated model, most buyers do in 
fact participate in period 1 (so that y1 ≈ 0), and switching is minimal in 
period 2. It follows that Equation (3.9) collapses to θ = y2 /2, where y2 is 
Firm B’s share of period-2 entrants under s > 0. Hence, in this case, θ = 
y* only if y2 = 2y*: Firm B claims twice as many period-2 entrants under 
s > 0 as it does in the frictionless equilibrium. The intuition behind 
this is that the average transaction cost, θ, approaches y* only if Firm 
B supplies very complex designs when s > 0. This is unlikely, and our 
calibrated model doesn’t bear this out. It follows that the quality adjust-
ment is too large in Equation (3.11), so that P δ2 > P*2 . 
Reacting to this, we wish to make two observations. First, if we 
make no changes to Equation (3.11), it could still be used productively 
by agencies with the understanding that it provides an upper bound on 
the true quality-adjusted price. Second, we can complement this upper 
bound by considering a lower bound; a comparison of the two will help 
better identify the true change. To see this, suppose the switching cost 
did not distort the distribution of market shares, so that y* = y2. Accord-
ingly, in the special case where θ = y2 /2, one can align P δ2 with P*2  by 
just dividing Δ* = y* τ in Equation (3.11) by 2. This yields an alternative 
to Equation (3.11), 
 
In all likelihood, the switching cost will affect the distribution of 
market shares—in particular, the entering fi rm will compete relatively 
aggressively to attract customers, since the buyers will be subsequently 
locked in. This suggests that y* < y2 = 2θ. As a result, y*  / 2 < θ, which 
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means that P̂ δ2  < P*2 : we obtain an estimate of P*2  that is downwardly 
biased. Comparing P̂δ2 to the baseline diff-in-diff index (Equation 
[3.11]), one can better gauge the true price change. We implement this 
procedure below.
We complete this discussion by quickly mentioning how to apply 
these indexes to period 3. In correspondence with the calibrated model, 
we assume both fi rms retain all buyers in period 3. Hence, Firm A sells 
to a measure 1 − y2 + 1 − y3 , and Firm B sells to a measure y2 + y3 . 
The calculations of each index then follow by analogy to their period-2 





is the average design supplied by Firm B in period 3. Next, the within 
index is obtained by fi rst computing the change in each supplier’s mar-
ket price and then aggregating these price changes across suppliers. We 
use Tornqvist weights in the latter step, which yields
 ,
where 
is the average Firm A market share across periods 2 and 3. Finally, 
using the appropriate period-3 market shares, the average and diff-in-
diff indexes can be computed according to the expressions contained in 
Equation (3.10) and Equation (3.11). 
Results
Table 3.3 uses our calibrated model to assess the accuracy of the fea-
sible indexes. Each column corresponds to a period. Each row reports 
the gross price change implied by the index relative to the gross price 
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change implied by the benchmark. For instance, with respect to period 
2, the row that reports the average index presents 
.
Thus, if the estimate in the row is less than 1, the feasible index under-
states the true change. Equivalently, the feasible index overstates the 
decline in the price level between periods 1 and 2. 
The within and average indexes yield estimates in line with our 
expectations. As we showed in Section Two, roughly 40 percent of the 
period-2 price differential cannot be attributed to quality dispersion; 
Firm B does provide a real discount. As a result, the within index fails to 
capture the full extent of the decline in the average price level driven by 
the entry of Firm B. The table reveals that it overstates the price change 
(understates the price decline) by 8 percentage points. At the same time, 
as our discussion in Section Two noted, there is a quantitatively sig-
nifi cant component of price dispersion owing to difference in service 
quality. The average index fails to account for this and so understates 
the true price change. Equivalently, it overstates the price decline—in 
this case by about 4 percentage points. 
We now turn to the performance of the diff-in-diff index. The table 
reports results for both the baseline index derived from Pδ2 and the alter-
native based on P̂δ2 . As we anticipated, the baseline index (Equation 
[3.11]) outperforms the within index, since it treats a portion of Firm 
B’s price as a real, quality-adjusted discount relative to Firm A’s price. 
Accordingly, it better captures the decline in the average price level 
Table 3.3  Feasible Indexes Relative to Benchmark
NOTE: This table uses the solution to the calibrated model to calculate the gross price 
changes implied by a variety of price indexes. The results are expressed here relative 
to the true gross price change. See main text for a discussion of the indexes and Table 
3.1 for the calibration. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations of simulation results from the model in Section Two.
Period 2 Period 3
Within 1.082 1.047
Average 0.958 0.990
Diff-in-diff, baseline 1.032 1.001
Diff-in-diff, alternative 0.995 0.997
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when Firm B enters. Yet it still understates the extent of the price decline 
by 3 percentage points. Interestingly, the alternative index, based on P̂δ2,
performs noticeably better. As we noted earlier, it should be the case 
that P̂δ2   > P*2 , but this discrepancy depends on the distance between y2 
and y*. This distance turns out to be rather limited in this calibration, but 
we stress that it is hard to judge the robustness of this result.
As for period 3, the diff-in-diff indexes perform very well. Mechan-
ically, the reason is that Pδ2  and Pδ3 both overstate the corresponding 
true prices. These errors appear to cancel each other out, so the gross 
change, Pδ3 /Pδ2 , turns out to very nearly equal P*3 /P*2 . The same idea 
applies to the average index. However, with respect to the within index, 
errors do not cancel each other out so fortuitously; this continues to 
overstate the true price. Again, it is diffi cult to know if these results hint 
at a more general lesson. We hope continued work in this area will help 
elucidate this. 
CONCLUSION
This paper has studied the problem of price index construction for 
intermediate inputs when observed price differentials are combinations 
of unobserved heterogeneity and real, or frictional, price dispersion. 
In particular, it assesses several price indexes that can be feasibly con-
structed. Our results provide some guidance for how to adjust price 
indexes when a new low-price supplier, such as China, joins a market. 
In our application to the semiconductor market, we fi nd that if frictional 
dispersion is ignored, the price index overstates the true price decline 
due to entry by fi ve to eight percentage points. Ignoring unobserved het-
erogeneity, in contrast, means that lower-quality service by the entrant 
is not accounted for, and thus the price decline is overstated. We then 
try to provide a pathway between these extrema. Our diff-in-diff index 
exploits a simple insight: the cost of switching to a new supplier in this 
market sustains frictional dispersion during the early life of a product, 
but this infl uence abates as the market matures and the market leader’s 
original customers exit. Thus, late in the product life cycle, the price 
difference largely refl ects time-invariant quality differences. Accord-
ingly, one can use these observed late-in-life price differences to correct 
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for unobserved heterogeneity and thereby isolate the extent of real price 
dispersion. For this reason, our diff-in-diff index performs quite well as 
an approximation to the true price change.
Our assessment, of course, is confi ned to a particular market in the 
semiconductor sector. Yet we believe our approach provides a fruitful 
way forward in this literature. That approach, in sum, consists of a few 
components: gather detailed data for a particular industry; develop a 
quantitative model of industry dynamics that can be fi tted to these data; 
and assess alternative, feasible price indexes within the context of the 
parameterized model. If applied to several industries, we believe this 
approach has the promise of revealing more general lessons for price 
index measurement. 
Notes
 1.  By “Taiwan,” we mean Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, or 
TSMC, the largest wafer fabrication fi rm in Asia. Most of its properties are in Tai-
wan, though it has one plant in Shanghai. However, the vast majority of produc-
tion in China is due to Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, 
or SMIC. When we refer to “China,” then, we mean SMIC. 
 2.  China typically enters two years after Taiwan initiates production.
 3.  See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and Klemperer (1995) for surveys.
 4.  This quote is from a report describing the Common Platform technology alliance. 
This is an industry group consisting of a few large chip manufacturers—IBM, 
Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing, and Samsung. The group advocates for 
a “common platform” that would standardize aspects of semiconductor produc-
tion technology. However, this alliance has not yet had a material impact on stan-
dardizing mask sets (McGregor 2007).
 5.  We have obtained a handful of these contracts. A representative agreement in terms 
of how price discrimination is handled is one between Altera Corp. and TSMC. It 
states that “TSMC shall calculate an average price for such Process in use at all of 
TSMC’s . . . plants,” and if the buyer’s price “deviates, up or down, by more than 
three percent (3%) from the [average price],” the buyer’s price will be adjusted 
in the direction of the average price. Note that this agreement does not commit 
TSMC to a particular price path over time. The contract merely restricts price 
discrimination in a given period, consistent with the model’s assumptions. This 
agreement is found at http://corporate.fi ndlaw.com/contracts/operations/purchase
-agreement-taiwan-semiconductor-manufacturing-co-ltd.html (accessed April 22, 
2014). 
 6.  See Nishimura and Friedman (1981) for an analysis of this class of games. They 
provide suffi cient conditions to ensure a pure-strategy equilibrium, but these con-
ditions can only be confi rmed ex post. This is, in effect, what we aim to do. 
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 7.  It is not immediate that there is a unique solution for y2 , but we have always 
located one in practice. The intuition for this is as follows. The discounted sum of 
Firm B prices is relatively low when y2 is low (i.e., when Firm B’s customer base 
is small, it sets lower prices in period 3 to attract new entrants). But the discounted 
sum of Firm B prices is also increasing at a relatively fast rate as y2 rises. This 
refl ects the quality premium, as captured by τy2. Together, these features imply 
a single crossing, with the right side of Equation (3.3) cutting the left side from 
below.
 8.  Interestingly, another way to make F(y) > pA1 a necessary condition is to drop the 
nonnegativity constraint and to assume that ideas are instead perfectly storable. 
This would imply that a fi rm would never produce in period 1 if its instantaneous 
profi ts were negative; it would just store the idea and join the market in period 2. 
Note that, since production runs for two periods, these late entrants would presum-
ably live through period 3. This points to the downside of this approach: delayed 
entry reverberates through the model’s periods 2 and 3 and creates a more com-
plicated dynamic problem. Moreover, the payoff from this added complication is 
rather small. As we discuss, the model will be calibrated in such a way that the 
measure of fi rms that delay entry is very small, so its quantitative implications 
cannot be too great. For this reason, we choose the simpler approach in the main 
text.
 9.  The subsequent two paragraphs are taken from Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels 
(2013) (see Appendix 6D).
 10.  For example, a contract between Quicklogic and TSMC states, “The term of this 
Agreement shall . . . continue for a period of three (3) years, renewable annually 
as a rolling three (3) year Agreement.”
 11.  Since the lowest-quality buyer in Firm A’s cohort has payoff R + ryt in period 
t = {2,3}, it follows that Firm A buyers will in fact participate if R exceeds 
maxt{pAt }. Furthermore, if r > τ (as it does, in our calibration), then the highest-
quality customer of Firm B will participate if R is greater than maxt{pBt }. 
 12.  We also stress that, although y2 ≈ 1/2 in our model, the approach suggested by 
Equation (3.4) can be applied robustly to real-world data even if there are certain 
deviations from this. For instance, if y2 is smaller than ½, then Δ3 overestimates its 
frictionless counterpart. As a result, if we used Δ3 as a proxy for the contribution of 
unobserved heterogeneity to the price differential, we would obtain a lower bound 
on the degree of pure (frictional) price dispersion. This property can be desirable 
in certain circumstances. For instance, though we assume the suppliers provide the 
same physical input here, data limitations may make it impossible for a statistical 
agency to do any direct hedonic-style quality adjustments for product composi-
tion. In that case, it may want to err on the side of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 13.  Turley (2003) provides an accessible overview of semiconductor technology, 
manufacturing, and business. 
 14.  The GSA data do not provide fi rm identifi ers, only the country in which the sup-
plier is located.
 15.  See Table 3 in Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) for the full list of regression 
coeffi cients from the hedonic model. 
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 16.  To be more precise, Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels (2013) regress the price differ-
ential on, among other controls, a quadratic time trend and product fi xed effects; 
the latter control for changes in the composition of technologies. The dotted line, 
referred to in Figure 3.2 as the “within-technology fi t,” is the estimated time trend. 
 17.  Byrne, Kovak, and Michaels make the correction embodied in Equation (3.6) to 
the raw wafer price differentials in order to isolate the component that is due to 
real dispersion. In their application, they interpret “late in the product life cycle” 
to be roughly fi ve years after Chinese entry, based on the length of typical semi-
conductor fabrication contracts (see the subsection titled “Quantitative Analysis,” 
beginning on p. 100). Then, drawing from Figure 3.2, the authors interpret Δ3 = Δ* 
≈ $150. Netting this off of the observed period-2 differential, Δ2 , yields the quality-
adjusted component. For instance, the average differential 10 quarters after Chi-
nese entry is about $375, so the authors estimate that 60 percent  refl ects 
real price dispersion. Hence, the wafer data indicate more frictional dispersion 
than implied by the model.
 18.  Simple averaging across buyers is appropriate within our theoretical model 
because the production service, modulo τy, is in fact identical. The BLS does not 
follow this approach when aggregating across outlets’ prices at the most detailed 
level (the item-area stratum) of the CPI. This is because BLS staff worry that dif-
ferent outlets’ items are not in fact the same. See Hausman and Leibtag (2009) for 
more on this practice. See Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) for a general discussion of 
aggregation within the CPI.
 19.  The weights are formed from the quantity of units sold by each supplier. Through-
out, we do assume that the statistical agency has access to price and revenue data 
from the supplier, so that quantities may be inferred. The BLS International Price 
Program does request data on the dollar value of trade for each good when a fi rm 
is initiated into the survey. 
 20.  The average index does embody a slight recognition of quality differences, in 
that it excludes never-before-priced designs in period 2. In this sense, the index 
acknowledges that some period-2 goods are “too different” from the basket of 
goods in period 1 to be included in the index. We take this approach to try to 
capture the fact that the statistical agency does observe repeated sales of the same 
product, even if it does not observe quality precisely. Still, this inclusion only of 
designs y > y1, as opposed to all designs, makes little quantitative difference to our 
results, since y1 is so close to zero.
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